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Regarding the Guantanamo Uyghurs 
February 25, 2009 in Xinjiang by The China Beat | 6 comments 
By James Millward 
I never thought I’d see “Free the Uighurs” on the editorial pages of major U.S. newspapers, but there 
it was last Thursday in the Washington Post (Editorial, February 19, 2009, p. A14) and Monday in 
the Los Angeles Times (Editorial, Feb. 23, 2009). Of course, the editorial was not discussing Uyghurs 
in China, but the seventeen Uyghur detainees at Guantanamo, whom a federal appeals court ruled 
could be brought to the U.S. only by an act of the executive branch, not the courts. The Post urged 
the Obama administration to do the right thing by these men, whom the Bush administration 
acknowledged years ago were not “enemy combatants” but whom it could neither send back to China 
nor find a third country willing to take. 
It was not that long ago that references to Uyghurs hardly ever appeared in the international press. 
From the late 1980s through the late 1990s there were occasional stories, when reporters given rare 
opportunities to travel to Xinjiang sought out silk road exotica and separatism—story lines they seem 
to have settled on before their trip. It was not hard to flesh out the template with colorful minority 
clothing, mutton kabobs and some young guy in the bazaar complaining about the Chinese. The rare 
actual violent incidents were exciting—they fit the imagined narrative that Xinjiang was a “simmering 
cauldron” or “powder-keg waiting to blow.” But they were harder to write about, as information was 
scant and mainly filtered through PRC state media, which was then intent on minimizing any local 
unrest or dissent. Internally, in the late 1990s Xinjiang Party officials still worried about the Xinjiang 
issue becoming “internationalized”—in other words, emerging, like Tibet, as a global cause célèbre. 
After September 11th, 2001, China abruptly reversed course, deliberately publicizing the issue of 
Uyghur dissent as “terrorism, separatism and religious extremism,” and explicitly linking potential 
unrest in Xinjiang (the region was in fact quiet from 1997 through 2008) to Al Qaeda and the U.S. 
“global war on terror.” This linkage was accomplished through a document issued in English by the 
State Council in January 2002, official press reports, and print and broadcast interviews with Chinese 
leaders. The message was much reiterated in subsequent years; state media and PRC leaders 
proclaimed Uyghurs to be the main potential security risk to the 2008 Olympics (in the spring before 
and during the Olympics, there were in fact three incidents of what seems to have been politically-
inspired violence involving Uyghurs in Xinjiang.) 
The U.S. government, international media and anti-terrorism think-tanks contributed to the re-
branding of Uyghur dissent as a “movement” motivated by Islamist thinking and linked to 
“international terror organizations.” Stereotyped notions about Islam and a paucity of solid firsthand 
information about Xinjiang made plausible the idea that Al Qaeda-type Uyghur jihadis were “waging” a 
“militant” “resistance” against Chinese authorities, even in absence of anything like a terrorist attack 
for over a decade. Because every “movement” needs an acronym, concerns crystallized around ETIM 
(East Turkestan Islamic Movement), one of several groups mentioned in the Chinese State Council 
document. The U.S. listed ETIM as an international terrorist organization in 2002 and mistakenly 
attributed to it all the violent acts reported by the PRC as having occurred in Xinjiang for the ten years 
prior to 1997, though Chinese sources themselves up to that point had not attributed any specific acts 
to ETIM (they did so subsequently). The U.S. thus made ETIM the name to conjure with.[1] 
Now the “Uyghur issue” is well and truly internationalized, thanks to U.S. and Chinese policies and 
rhetoric over the past several years. Indeed, at the moment it stands at the crux of U.S.-Chinese 
relations. In order to close down Guantanamo prison, as President Obama has pledged, detainees who 
cannot be repatriated must be resettled elsewhere. In order to convince third countries to accept 
Guantanamo detainees, the U.S. must first show willingness to resettle some itself. Politically, the 
Uyghurs are the easiest choice among the detainees for U.S. asylum: they were determined by the 
Bush administration to harbor “no animus” towards the United States; there is a measure of 
Congressional support for their resettlement thanks in part to effective lobbying efforts by the Uyghur 
America Association (itself funded by the U.S. government through the National Endowment for 
Democracy); and the Uyghur community here is eager to help in the detainees’ transition. 
Of course, the PRC government strongly opposes resettling Uyghurs from Guantanamo in the U.S. or 
anywhere else, and wants them sent back to China. As Li Wei, from the China Institute of 
Contemporary International Relations, put it in an interview with NPR’s Anthony Kuhn (Morning 
Edition, Feb. 20, 2009), “what would the American government think if China sheltered people who 
threatened America’s national security?” Li makes a reasonable point: if China publicly resettled Al 
Qaeda trainees from Afghan camps, the U.S. would take this as a major affront. 
So now, with the Obama-era U.S.-China relationship still unformed, an act critical to realizing the 
president’s promise to shut down Guantanamo will also, like it or not, be seen as his major first act 
related to China: granting asylum to a group of men China has repeatedly and publicly denounced as 
violent terrorist members of ETIM. The Chinese public and most Chinese academics, party-members 
and officials sincerely believe Uyghur terrorists pose a grave security threat to China. ETIM is their Al 
Qaeda. 
Moreover, despite the fact that no country and no serious scholar disputes the legality of China’s 
sovereignty in Xinjiang, some Chinese believe the U.S. supports and foments Uyghur terrorism in 
order to destabilize China. American academics who write about Xinjiang have been (falsely) accused 
in Chinese publications of working with the U.S. government to provide “a theoretical basis for one 
day taking action to dismember China and separate Xinjiang” (Pan Zhiping, in his introduction to the 
internal Chinese translation of Frederick Starr, ed. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Frontier). We should not 
underestimate the perception gap between the U.S. and China over Xinjiang and the Uyghurs. In 
China, the issue is as radioactive as the sands of Lop Nor. 
Thus, while the U.S. press has discussed the Guantanamo Uyghurs mainly as a domestic U.S. political 
and legal issue, their fate could have a great impact on U.S.-China relations at this critical time. The 
legacy of the Bush administration’s China policy is often treated as broadly positive, thanks to the role 
played by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and resultant stress on economic affairs. However, the 
Guantanamo Uyghurs are another huge mess Bush got us into. Thanks to Bush-era mistakes and the 
fuzzy but dangerous notion of “global war on terror,” the Obama administration faces yet another 
potential crisis—one in U.S.-China relations—right off the bat. 
The U.S. should recognize that while resettling the seventeen Uyghurs here may be the only way to 
break the Guantanamo log-jam, to do so will mean asking China to swallow something extremely 
unpalatable. If a blow-up in U.S.-China relations can be averted, it will be because American diplomats 
handle the issue with the extreme sensitivity it merits, and because China chooses to overlook U.S. 
hypocrisy and place the greater interests of good Sino-U.S. ties over their entrenched rhetorical 
position on Xinjiang. In so doing they will help us put yet another Bush-era disaster behind us and 
move on. 
James Millward teaches Chinese history at Georgetown University and is the author of, most 
recently, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (2006). 
[1] On the mistakes in the public US statement accompanying the U.S. listing of ETIM, see my 
“Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: a Critical Assessment,” East West Center policy studies #6, 
Washington D.C.: East West Center, 2004. 
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